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are asked to consider a judge who sentences people with Afro-
centric features more severely (without being aware of this bias)
because he perceives them as less intelligent. Yet this time, any
conscious justiﬁcation given by judges cannot be the same as
the “proximal” cue, since the judges in these cases would presum-
ably not rationalize their decisions in terms of any aspect of the
suspects’ appearance whatsoever: They would simply not be
aware that the perception of a face as either Afrocentric or unin-
telligent would inﬂuence their judgment. In such cases there is
clearly a disconnect between the conscious justiﬁcation made by
an agent and causes of their behavior. In this context, it is interest-
ing that a recent mock-jury study found that when given a chance
to deliberate, jurors were more likely to ﬁnd an attractive defen-
dant guilty, whereas without deliberation they were more likely
to ﬁnd a non-attractive defendant guilty (Patry 2008). This
ﬁnding is in accord with a more dynamic picture of the uncon-
scious than the one that N&S paint.
Finally, N&S omit any discussion of the extensive developmen-
tal literature on the ontogeny of children’s decision making. Yet
that literature is highly relevant to the conceptual limitations of
their article, in that there are many experimental tasks (reviewed
by Karmiloff-Smith 1992) for which younger children are unable
to articulate why they have a preference for a particular behavioral
choice, but for which older children are able to explain the con-
scious reasoning behind their choices. Because of this type of tran-
sition, developmental research currently represents a growing
point in dual-process accounts of decision making (e.g., Stanovich
et al. 2011). Taking a developmental perspective leads us again to
emphasize the dynamic relationship between conscious and
unconscious inﬂuences on decision making, because observing
how children solve certain tasks makes it clear that conscious
thought processes can come to modulate decision making that
was previously performed automatically.
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Abstract: Newell & Shanks (N&S) argue against the idea that any
signiﬁcant role for unconscious inﬂuences on decision making has been
established by research to date. Inasmuch as this conclusion applies to
the idea of an “intelligent cognitive unconscious,” we would agree. Our
concern is that the article could lead the unwary to conclude that there
are no unconscious inﬂuences on decision making – and never could be.
We give reasons why this may not be the case.
We begin by raising some general methodological issues regarding
the assessment of insight, and then we move to considering other
examples from our own work that also bear on the thesis of the
article. The ﬁrst methodological issue we wish to raise regards
the possible knock on effects of measuring insight in the stringent
way that Newell & Shanks (N&S) recommend. Although we agree
that the immediacy criterion is well-motivated in principle, the
concurrent measurement of awareness with performance could
predispose participants to use a conscious decision strategy in a
situation where they may otherwise use an unconscious strategy.
Indeed, this criterion seems fundamentally at odds with N&S’s
recommendation that highly reﬂective situations should be
avoided in the study of unconscious decision making. The
authors argue that online judgments do not alter judgment strat-
egies by citing a study which showed that the inclusion of an
online awareness measure made no difference to performance
(Lagnado et al. 2006), but in reaching this conclusion N&S are
relying on a null result (an approach they criticise when it provides
evidence in support of unconscious processes). Furthermore, the
absence of performance differences does not rule out the possi-
bility that different processing strategies are being used to obtain
a similar level of performance in the two versions of the task.
The second methodological issue pertains to the narrative
rather than the systematic review approach that appears to have
been adopted in the article. We agree with N&S that a focus on
particular inﬂuential domains in such a review is entirely appropri-
ate, but we feel that a systematic search strategy for identifying
studies in each domain should have been articulated. For
example, work we have conducted has found some evidence for
unconscious inﬂuences on a variant of the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT) (Dunn et al. 2011) that we feel offers some support for
the unconscious account and would have been relevant here. In
particular, using the stringent insight criterion outlined by Maia
and McClelland (2004) that meet the reliability, relevance, imme-
diacy, and sensitivity criteria, we found that participants behav-
iourally acquired a modiﬁed IGT task prior to being able to
articulate conscious awareness. Although the methodology of
this study can also be criticised (on the basis of low power), this
nevertheless is some evidence for unconscious decision-making
inﬂuences. Therefore, the review can be critiqued on the
grounds that its coverage of each domain is in parts selective.
The third methodological issue is that the insight literature has
generally neglected a potentially prominent role for individual
differences – namely, that individuals’ performance may be
more or less driven by unconscious inﬂuences. Consistent with
this position, verbal reports indicate that the degree to which per-
formance on the IGT is driven by conscious awareness varies
between individuals (e.g., Guillaume et al. 2009, although we
acknowledge the limitations of the way awareness was indexed
in this study). Similarly, individual differences exist in the extent
to which anticipatory bodily signals (arguably a measure of uncon-
scious inﬂuence) are associated with task acquisition on the IGT
and its variants (Dunn et al. 2011; Guillaume et al. 2009).
If marked individual differences do exist, this means that
attempts to characterise behaviour at the population level are
likely to be doomed to failure. In other words, the question
should shift from “is behaviour driven by unconscious inﬂuences?”
to “in which individuals and contexts is behaviour most driven by
unconscious inﬂuences?”
Turning now to examples taken from our own research that are
also relevant to this debate, our position is that there are other
types of unconscious inﬂuence on decision making, in particular
the inﬂuence of automatic, associative processes on behaviour.
The case is slightly complicated by the fact that associative pro-
cesses do not have to proceed in the absence of awareness, but
equally they do not require it either (McLaren et al. 1994),
which immediately raises the possibility that there can be
instances of unconscious inﬂuences on decision making involving
processing of this type. We will focus on the demonstrations of
peak-shift in humans by Jones and McLaren (1999) and Livesey
and McLaren (2009), though we could equally appeal to demon-
strations of implicit sequence learning by Jones and McLaren
(2009) and Spiegel and McLaren (2006), which make the point
that the decisions made by participants are quite different when
they are aware (a monotonic function consistent with rule use)
or unaware (a non-monotonic function consistent with peak-
shift) of the contingencies in play. Participants had to classify
green squares by pressing one of two keys. The participants
were not informed that the squares varied in either brightness
(1999) or hue (2009), and so the correct response had to be
learned by trial and error (they were given feedback). During a
subsequent test phase (without feedback) they were shown
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stimuli that varied over a much wider range of brightness or hue.
At this point those participants that were unable to specify that the
correct attribute to guide their decisions exhibited the typical
“peak-shift” pattern of responding seen in similar experiments
with pigeons (e.g., Hanson 1957). Other participants who
became aware of the attributes relevant to responding (either
during training or testing) showed a different pattern, with per-
formance improving monotonically as they moved from the train-
ing stimuli to more extreme values.
The awareness test used in this experiment clearly fails the sen-
sitivity criterion that the authors would apply, and yet our point is
that there is actually a strong case to be made for this being an
example of unconscious inﬂuences on decision making. The key
here is the correlation between verbal report and the pattern of per-
formance. If participants say they are aware of the critical attribute’s
role in the task, then they show one pattern. If they are not aware of
it, then they show a different pattern similar to that seen in pigeons.
N&S may still argue that both patterns of performance are due to
conscious cognitive processes; however, this would lead to an
entirely new interpretation of peak-shift in pigeons. If the expla-
nation in terms of conscious cognitive processes is taken to apply
only to humans, then wemust ask why such an unparsimonious pos-
ition is being adopted, with one explanation for humans and
another for infra-humans. Either way, this type of evidence poses
a considerable challenge for the analysis offered in this article.
Better tests of consciousness are needed, but
skepticism about unconscious processes is
unwarranted
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Abstract: What people report is, at times, the best evidence we have for
what they experience. Newell & Shanks (N&S) do a service for debates
regarding the role of unconscious inﬂuences on decision making by
offering some sound methodological recommendations. We doubt,
however, that those recommendations go far enough. For even if people
have knowledge of the factors that inﬂuence their decisions, it does not
follow that such knowledge is conscious, and plays a causal role, at the
time the decision is made. Moreover, N&S fail to demonstrate that
unconscious thought plays no role at all in decision making. Indeed,
such a claim is quite implausible. In making these points we comment
on their discussion of the literature on expertise acquisition and the
Iowa Gambling Task.
Newell & Shanks (N&S) argue that there is little reason to think
that unconscious thought plays a signiﬁcant role in decision
making. But they cast their net of evidence too narrowly. In par-
ticular, we worry that the research they marshal in support of their
claim is either (a) consistent with competing interpretations that
are supported by other lines of research or (b) fails to show that
all elements that go into reaching a decision are conscious.
While the data that N&S cite show that we have more knowledge
of the factors that underwrite our decisions than was previously
thought, they do not show that this knowledge informs our
decisions or is conscious at the time the decision is made.
To begin, many of the studies that N&S cite demonstrate that,
at best, people have post facto knowledge of the factors that ﬁgure
in their decision making, not that those factors are conscious
during the decision-making process itself. Consider, for
example, N&S’s discussion of studies of expert decision making
that purport to ﬁnd a discrepancy between explicit and implicit
policies, or between explicit and implicit knowledge of the
environmental cues that inﬂuence one’s decisions. Previous
studies had asked people to estimate their reliance on each cue,
ﬁnding little correlation between those judgments and actual
decision-making practice, thus suggesting that their reliance on
those cues was unconscious. But if people are presented,
instead, with a variety of sets of cue weightings and are asked to
select which most closely resembles the strategy they use, then
they prove quite accurate. N&S take this to show that people
follow a conscious decision strategy. However, that one has a
capacity to recognize one’s policy does not begin to show that
one consciously employs that policy. For the display may trigger
an implicit memory of the previously deployed, but an uncon-
scious decision strategy, which then primes the person’s selection.
One reason to prefer this explanation is that it is a familiar ﬁnding
in the perception literature that masked stimuli produce implicit
memories, which can then modify behavior in future tasks (Leut-
hold & Kopp 1998; Schacter 1992).
Of course, we grant that this hardly settles the matter and that
further experimentation is required. In agreement with N&S’s
“immediacy” criterion, we suggest that what is needed in this
type of case is introspection sampling, where people are cued at
irregular intervals to report the contents of their conscious aware-
ness (Hurlburt & Akhter 2006). Post facto measurements of con-
scious awareness not only run the risk of participants tapping into
implicit memories or accessing knowledge that played no active
part in the decision-making process, but they also run the risk
of participants forgetting what they had in fact been conscious of.
Similar points hold in connection with N&S’s discussion of the
Iowa Gambling Task. They point out that when Maia and McClel-
land (2004) use a more explicit and less open-ended set of probe
questions than had previously been employed, people show
awareness of which decks are the good ones, and of the approxi-
mate long-term payoffs of the decks, as soon as they start to
choose appropriately. N&S take this to show that it is conscious
knowledge of payoffs that drives people’s choices. Yet it may be
(as Maia &McClelland themselves note) that in their online selec-
tions people rely on their affective responses toward the various
options, without conscious judgments of relative goodness or
approximate payoffs playing any causal role in the process.
Indeed, when asked, people may base their judgments of good-
ness on their concurrent affective reaction while they contemplate
making a selection from each deck. Moreover, they may either be
able to reconstruct a rough estimate of the payoffs of each deck
from memory, or else they may have constructed such a model
in an ongoing manner following each trial.
Not only is this alternative construal of the data possible, but it
is preferable. For it can smoothly accommodate the ﬁndings from
patients with damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC)
(which is widely accepted to be the primary site of cortical rep-
resentations of affect; Rolls 1999). Such patients continue to
make bad choices in the Iowa Gambling Task, despite having
good knowledge of the expected payoffs from each deck
(Bechara et al. 2000). This ﬁnding makes good sense if people
base their selections on their affective responses (which are
absent or attenuated in VMPFC patients) while at the same
time building a conceptual model of the task contingencies. To
accommodate these data N&S will need to claim that in the
normal case it is conscious judgments of comparative goodness
that drive one’s affective reactions. We know, however, that affec-
tive responses occur quite swiftly. It is implausible to claim that in
every case they are preceded by conscious conceptual appraisals
of the situation.
Even if we set aside these concerns about N&S’s treatment of
the data, however, they will need to posit some mechanism that
can maintain an approximate running total of the net winnings
from each deck. Otherwise the judgments of comparative good-
ness and likely payoffs from each deck that they appeal to will
appear magical. But it is quite implausible that participants are
aware of calculating these approximate running totals during the
gambling task, in the way that one might be aware of calculating
Commentary/Newell & Shanks: Unconscious inﬂuences on decision making
36 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2014) 37:1
